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SOME IDEAS ON THE UNIFORM GIFTS TO MINORS ACT
By its recent adoption of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act,1 Pennsylvania
became the 29th jurisdiction to enact uniform gift legislation based upon
model statutes proposed by the New York Stock Exchange and the Association of Stock Exchange Firms.'
The purposes to 'be achieved by such legislation have been variously stated.'
Some of these, the simplification of gifts to minors and the satisfaction of
Internal Revenue Code requirements of qualification for the annual gift tax
exclusion, could be as readily accomplished through means of existing
methods of making gifts to minors.' Others, such as national standardization
of a method of making such gifts through a simple procedure, with relatively
adequate safeguards to the minor; the establishment of a standard recognized
procedure for the protection of brokers and stock transfer agents in permitting
floor transfers of securities sold on recognized exchanges; and the elimination of uncertainties involved in the making of transfers where securities are
registered in the names of transferors in a fiduciary capacity, without the need
of varying degrees of proof of authority depending on the type of transfer,
are objectives which the Act if successful may further in a more admirable
way. The purpose of this paper will be an attempt to highlight some of these
problems and to evaluate them in the light of current legislation. There will
be no attempt to exhaust either the problems the Act attempts to solve or the
possible problems it creates. References will be made to presently existing
legislation without any effort to exhaust all the alternatives existing thereunder. By and large, the reader will be left to draw his own conclusions as
to whether in a particular case the degree of risk, expense, and time justify the
use of one or the other methods.
In the field of Estate Planning the use of the Uniform Act will by its very
content be somewhat circumscribed. The initial subject matter will 'be limited
to gifts of money or securities.' In addition, where more substantial gifts are
desired, greater flexibility in provisions and content will generally be desirable.
Where such flexibility is the objective of the estate planner, the singular rigid
formula governing all phases of the gift from delivery to final distribution,
which is presented by the Uniform Act, will not be an adequate tool.
1

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,

29

§§ 3601-3611.

B.U.L.A. 174.

3 See 22

BROOKLYN L. REV. 314; 29 PA. BAR ASS'N. Q. 36.
4 See October 1956 FIDUCIARY REVIEW.
5
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3603 (a).
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NOTES
EXONERATION PROVISIONS

One of the biggest problems which the act attempts to solve and certainly
one of the major reasons the New York Stock Exchange and Association of
Stock Exchange Firms has -been so vehement in the sponsorship of the Uniform
Act is exoneration.' In the case of gifts to minors such a provision is essential
if those persons subjected to possible liabilities, growing chiefly out of an infant's contractual disability, are to be encouraged in the making of requested
transfers of small amounts of stock where such transfers may be in excess of
authority granted by an instrument or by a statute. Should such a transfer
be made, the transfer agent subjects himself to possible liability on the basis
of a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1848, the rule of
which has become firmly entrenched in the law of corporations.' The gist of
that decision is that the transfer of stock is a trust in the hands of the corporation for the protection of individual shareholders' interests. The corporation
in the position of a trustee is bound to execute the trust with proper diligence
and care and is responsible for any injury sustained by its negligence or misconduct.
The transfer agent might avail himself of the supposed modern day panacea of all evils, insurance; or he might pass the buck and insist upon a signature guaranty, which a banker or broker, familiar with fiduciary and fearing
the loss of a potential customer, will undoubtedly give. Absent some such
assurance the transfer agent may be in the position of an imprudent man unless
he insists upon some proof of authority as evidenced by a will, trust instrument,
or other inter vivos instrument of conveyance.
It is manifest from above that the uninitiated or infrequent transferor
of small amounts of securities being held for the benefit of another would
encounter cumbersome and comparatively costly procedures.
Although Pennsylvania has recognized broad powers on behalf of donors
in appointing guardians of a minor's estate,' and broad powers of dealing with
6 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3607. "No issuer, transfer agent, bank, broker or other person,
acting on the instructions of or otherwise dealing with any person purporting to act as a donor
or in the capacity of a custodian, is responsible for determining whether the person designated by
the purported donor, or purporting to act as a custodian, has been duly designated, or whether
any purchase, sale or transfer to or by or any other act of any person purporting to act in the
capacity of custodian is in accordance with or authorized by this act, or is obliged to inquire into
the validity or propriety under this act of any instrument or instructions executed or given by a
person purporting to act as a donor or in the capacity of a custodian, or is bound to see to the
application by any person purporting to act in the capacity of a custodian of any money or other
property paid or delivered to him."
See e.g. Fiduciaries Act of 1949 § 1063 and § 1066, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1063 and
§ 320.1066.
8 C. K. Lowry v. Commercial and Farmers Trust Company, 15 Fed. Cas. 1040, No. 8,581 (C.C.
Md. 1848).
(guardian of estate or interest named in conveyance);
9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1178 (1945)
Wills Act of 1947, as amended, § 18, (appointment of testamentary guardian).
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the estate without posting bond, 10 the responsibilities of third persons have not
been similarly lessened, and there is reason to believe that Article 8 of the Commercial Code "' has stiffened what was previously a liberal provision in favor
of transfer agents.
Pennsylvania was one of the pioneers in the enactment of an exoneration
statute.12 This act exempted transfer agents of municipal or other corporations
from seeing to the execution of any trust unless he "shall have previously received actual notice in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person or persons
for whom such stocks appear by the certificate thereof to be held in trust, that
the proposed transfer would be a violation of such trust." It was held under
this Act that the trustee might require transfer of such stock without advancing evidence of his right to transfer it." This exemption was almost as broad
as that now found in the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act although somewhat
more limited in the persons to whom it extended.
This Act was superseded by the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. 4 Here the
transfer agent was exonerated so long as he acted in good faith and the transfer was made without actual knowledge of breach of an obligation. It should
be noted that a literal reading of the statute would not include the case where
stock was registered in the name of the person for whom the fiduciary is acting in endorsing and transferring the stock, such as a minor, or the situation
where stock is listed in the name of a third party nominee of the fiduciary.
Section 3 of the Act was amended several times, and its present version
is in P. L. 1068, Section 1, enacted August 19, 1953. This section which became effective July 1, 1954, so as to correspond with the effective date of the
Uniform Commercial Code, " continues the actual knowledge and bad faith
requirements of the original act. By cross reference to Section 8-403 of the
Commercial Code the provisions dealing with transfer agents are incorporated
in cases of investment securities.
Pennsylvania became the first state to enact the Code." This enactment
of the Code, based on a joint undertaking of the American Law Institute and
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, has been followed by enactment in Kentucky and Massachusetts. Consequently, the exoneration provisions of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act have been much more universally made part of state law.
10 Fiduciaries Act of 1949 § 1022, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1022.
"PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 8-101 el seq. (1953).
12 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3151 (1874).
13 Phelps v. Philadelphia, 12 Phila. 300, 35 L.I. 27 (1878).
14PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3351 (1923).
15 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A.
16 Act of April 6, 1953 P.L. 3, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-101 et seq.
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The exact interpretation to be placed upon the provisions of the Code
as well as the Uniform Gift Act remains to be seen. About all that can be
done at this time is to examine the language of each.
Section 8-403 of the Code requires that the security 'be fully indorsed to
exonerate the issuer; and here it should be noted that under Section 8-406
(1) (6) a transfer agent has the same obligation to the holder or owner as
the issuer has. Section 8-402 (1) provides that a security is fully indorsed
when the indorsements are sufficient to make the person presenting it a holder.
Under Section 8-402 (2) (f), the issuer shall not require more evidence to
establish an indorsement than in the case of, "an executor, administrator,
trustee, receiver, or other fiduciary, an indorsement signed by such fiduciary,
a guarantee of that signature, and proof that the person signing was such
fiduciary at the date of signing."
It thus appears by negative implication that compliance with Section 8402 (2) (f) is necessary in order that an indorsement be sufficient and that
under Section 8-402 (1) a sufficient indorsement is necessary to have a full
indorsement. Without a full indorsement the exoneration provisions of Section 8-403 are inapplicable.
As noted earlier, these impediments to the rapid and safe transfer of
securities have served as restaints on both transfer agent and donor or transferor of small amounts of stock. As pointed out earlier, the Pennsylvania
statutes since 1874 have been very liberal. It would appear that the detail
of the Commercial Code restricts this liberality.
With that problem in mind, the broad exoneration provision of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, eliminates responsibility for determining whether
a purported custodian is actually a custodian, or whether his transfer is in accordance with the provisions of the Act, or whether or not the property or
proceeds are properly applied, regardless of the nature of the transfer, provides
a ready incentive and should remove any hesitancy in the making of small
transfers of securities.
It should be mentioned here again that in the case of larger gifts such
liberal provisions may be unwise.
INVESTMENTS

Another interesting and potentially litigious section of the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act is found in Section 5 (e),"7 dealing with investments. Instead
17 PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 20,

§ 3605 (e).
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of incorporating state statutes restricing investments to those contained in
certain "legal lists," the prudent man rule is adopted. In Pennsylvania existing statutes concerning investments by fiduciaries, with one exception, and
except as otherwise provided by the instrument, limit investments to "legal
list" investments.18 The exception is found in Section 13 of the Fiduciaries
Investment Act, and permits retention of unauthorized investments received
in kind so long as care and prudence is exercised in the retention. In this
latter situation the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act adopts a special rule and permits the custodian, "in his discretion and without liability to the minor or his
estate, [to] retain a security given to the minor in a manner prescribed in this
act."
This latter provision raises an interesting question when considered in
connection with Section 6 (e)" 9 of the Uniform Act. This section provides
that a custodian not compensated for his services will be liable for losses only
if they result from his bad faith, intentional wrong-doing, gross negligence,
or failure to maintain the standard of prudence in investing the custodial property provided in Section 5 (e).
An argument can be made that the provisions of Section 6 (e) are thereby
incorporated into Section 5 (e). Once this is done it is interesting to speculate whether the custodian who retains securities he received in kind would
be liable despite the nonliability provision in the case where such retention
amounts to gross negligence. Judicial opposition to exculpatory clauses and
provisions " might result in a general application of the gross negligence provision. This opens up a Pandora's box for purposes of deciding what constitutes gross negligence under the circumstances. It may have been thinking
such as this which prompted Earl S. MacNeill, in a recent article, Giving to
Minors Made Easy,2 to remark that a custodian, "had better determine to be
a prudent trustee." It may cast doubt upon the conclusion that the lax provisions of the Uniform Act must be weighed against the costs of more formal
22
but protective procedures involved in cases of trusts or guardianships.
Counter arguments are quickly suggested. Such an interpretation of Section 5 (e) and Section 6 (e) would hamper the effectiveness of the Act and
restrict its use, an objective certainly not consistent with the objectives of its
proponents. Persons desiring to use the simplified procedures of the Act are
18 Fiduciaries Act of 1949 § 940, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.940; Fiduciaries Investment
Act of 1949 § 2.
19 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3606 (e).
20 See e.g. Tuttle v. Gilmore 36 N. J. Eq. 617 (1883), where a very strained construction is
given such a clause in a trust instrument to afford the beneficiary greater protection.
21 MacNeill, Giving to Minors Made Easy, 35 TRUST BULLETIN 28 (1955).
22 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 390.
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confined to a set of ready-made standards. Thus, one cannot reserve limited
powers to alter or change provisions. This creates a need for an escape valve
where particular securities are delivered to an uncompensated custodian.
Probably the strongest argument is that by its express provisions, Section
6 (e) applies only in the case of a custodian not compensated for his services.
It would seem anomalous to say that one acting as a custodian for a consideration is bound only by the investment provisions, authorizing him without liability to retain investment securities, where a non-compensated custodian must
beware of gross negligence.
CUSTODIANS

Under the original Model Act, enacted by 13 jurisdictions," the class
of authorized custodians was limited to the donor, adult members of the
minor's family and guardian of the minor. This in itself was an indirect protection of the minor's interests and would have justified an exclusion as to
any standard of care at all in investments. It might even be argued that, as
a matter of policy, restrictions on liability when custodians were of such a
limited class would result in less litigation in a somewhat distasteful area.
This argument is removed, theoretically, if not practically, by extending
the list of possible custodians to any adult person and certain corporate fiduciaries in Section 3 of the Uniform Act.2 It should be noted for those who
have not yet familiarized themselves with the Act that permissible successor
custodians are more limited and must be either an adult member of the minor's
family, a guardian of the minor, or a trust company.2"
Several questions are raised by the provisions of Section 8 on successor
custodians. Under Section 8 (b) (1), a custodian, other than a donor, may
resign and designate a successor custodian. If the donor himself is custodian,
he must petition the court for permission to resign and for designation of a
successor custodian under Section 8 (3) (c). Since it is relatively clear that
the class of successors in either case is, as noted above, limited to one of the
three groups designated in Section 8 (a), in many cases it is questionable
whether one of the main purposes of the Act is not defeated. In the case
where the donor himself becomes the successor custodian, as in the case of a
parent, a recent Revenue Ruling " would seem to include the value of the
property in the donor's gross estate for the Federal estate tax. It is arguable
23 Calif., Colo., Conn., Dist. of Col., Ga., Mich., N. J., N. Y., N. Car., Ohio, R. I., S. Car.,
and Va.
24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3603.
25 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3608 (a).
26
Rev. Rul. 57-366, I.R.C. 1951-32, p. 20.
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that in such a case the donor is not the transferor but it is doubtful whether
several intermediate transfers will serve as a subterfuge to defeat this ruling.
If the successor custodian is either a guardian or a trust company the
donor may have lost the benefits to be gained by naming a guardian in the
conveyance.27 In either the case of a guardian or trust company costs sought
to be avoided in cases of small gifts will be inevitable.
TAx CONSEQUENCES

A brief resume of some of the tax problems and possible consequences
seems fitting in conclusion.
A special ruling issued March 24, 1956, stated that income would be
taxable to a parent to the extent it was used for the minor's support, irrespective
of who the donor is. This seems consistent with the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, Section 674 (b). Although that provision is applicable to trusts, the
relationship seems comparable. It suggests an additional problem in the possible existence under the Internal Revenue Code, Section 641, of a separate
taxable entity.2" Stated simply it is the question of, "What's in a name?" This
latter problem should be considered in light of Revenue Ruling 55-46a, Internal Revenue Code 1955-30, where a grandparent made gifts of stock to
his grandchildren. A state statute prohibited stocks in the name of minors
so they were registered in the name of the parents. It was held that no taxable
trust existed.
As regards the gift tax. Revenue Ruling 56-86, Internal Revenue Code
1956-11 dealing with the Colorado Statute concluded that there was compliance
with the present interest requirements of Internal Revenue Section 2503 (c).
Note here the custodian act is being treated as analogous to a trust.
In the case of the Estate Tax, as noted above, Revenue Ruling 57-366, Internal Revenue Code 1957-32 has held that the amount will be includible in
the gross estate of a donor-custodian. This seems consistent with Internal
Revenue Code Section 2036.29
CONCLUSION

It is only fair to conclude that, as under any new legislation, problems
of interpretation and construction will arise. Whether more specificity would
have avoided some of the problems is only a guess. It is certainly doubtful
Supra note 9.
cf. I.R.C. of 1954 § 641 (a) (1) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3605.
29 See also FIDUCIARY REVIEW, February, 1958.

27
28
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if this detailed approach has clarified the liability of transfer agents and issuers under Article 8 of the Commercial Code. As regards the estate planner
the Act is of such narrow scope as to be virtually useless. Whatever its consequence it represents another step in the enactment of more uniform state
laws. This objective seems desirable.
JOHN F. KRADEL.

